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ABSTRACT: 
What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony Tallis in 
Ian McEwan’s Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-
forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that, I 
argue, aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out 
a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony 
illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued 
self-reproach (such as Margaret Holmgren) are rightly concerned, she also 
shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between 
self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the 
significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative 
continuity. 
 
1. Introduction 
Is it possible to forgive oneself? If so, should the person who has done so, for a serious 
wrongdoing, be fully at peace with herself? Some philosophers, perhaps most famously 
Hannah Arendt, have denied the coherence of the very idea of self-forgiveness.1 Others, 
such as Charles Griswold, have recognised it as both coherent and important: a distinct 
phenomenon from accepting the forgiveness of others, and vital in circumstances where 
seeking such forgiveness is morally problematic. Yet Griswold still holds self-forgiveness to 
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fall short of what he calls “paradigmatic” forgiveness.2 One of the key ideas behind this 
article is that part of the problem with understanding self-forgiveness is a mistaken 
tendency to think of it in “all or nothing” terms. Robin S. Dillon articulates the problem as 
follows:  
One troubling dimension of much of what is written about self-forgiveness is the 
assumption that there are only two stances one can take towards the self: negative or 
positive, loathing or being at ease with oneself. But in truth there is a vast middle 
ground in which one could retain a complex view of oneself that is shot through with 
ambivalence … But, and here’s the important thing, to go on like this can be to have 
forgiven oneself. Self-forgiveness does not require extinguishing all self-reproach, for 
it is not really about the presence or absence of negative feelings and judgements; it’s 
about their power. Forgiving oneself means not that one no longer experiences self-
reproach but that one is no longer in bondage to it, no longer controlled or crippled by 
a negative conception of oneself and the debilitating pain of it, no longer alienated 
from oneself, so that one can now live well enough. This is possible even if one retains 
a measure of clear-sighted self-reproach, overcoming it without eliminating it.3 
This recognition of a self-forgiveness that retains room for continuing self-reproach is 
important. It allows for a self-forgiveness that strikes the appropriate mean between the 
excessively easy variety - peddled by many a self-help book – and the refusal to forgive 
oneself that may actually be a form of morally problematic pride. But Dillon’s view has met 
with criticism, several writers denying that it is a variety of self-forgiveness at all. Here, I 
consider the most detailed such critique, that of Margaret Holmgren, and argue that it rests 
upon a false either/or between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation which ultimately 
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begs the question against Dillon. I believe that Dillon is broadly right in the account that she 
sketches. But to see why, we need more detail than Dillon offers. This is best achieved 
through exploring a complex literary case, such as that of Briony Tallis, the central character 
in Ian McEwan’s novel Atonement. I shall argue that Briony demonstrates - firstly - aspects 
of the kind of self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach such as 
Holmgren are rightly concerned. But also – secondly - a way of getting beyond this, such 
that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is plausibly 
upheld. Seeing this involves considering what I shall call (borrowing a phrase from Joseph 
Kupfer) the moral perspective of humility. Central to such humility, we shall see, is not self-
abasement or ranking oneself low, but a sense of radical dependence and other-focus of a 
certain sort. In a comment on Arendt’s “elusive” reasons for dismissing the coherence of 
self-forgiveness, Griswold points out: “Her view does not consider the possibility of our 
viewing ourselves ‘from the outside,’ in the mirror of a notional ‘other’.”4 Through her 
narrative - in which she presents herself largely from the outside - Briony does precisely this. 
Holmgren, I argue, underplays the importance of narrative continuity in self-forgiveness and 
self-reconciliation - as Briony can help us to see.5 
2. Forgiveness and self-forgiveness in Atonement  
 
McEwan’s Atonement is a many-layered, complex story at the heart of which is the 
question of whether the central character, Briony Tallis, is able to forgive herself for a 
terrible error – described as a “crime” – she made in 1935 as a young teenager. The themes 
of forgiveness and self-forgiveness permeate the novel. In the early pages, the precocious 
thirteen-year-old Briony, a keen writer, has been preparing her latest play, The Trials of 
Arabella, for a family performance. But Briony’s young twin cousins, visiting in the wake of 
4 
 
their parents’ marital breakdown, are reluctant to participate in performing it, on the 
grounds that plays are “just showing off.”6 This, we are told, is precisely why Briony loves 
them: “everyone would adore her.” (The lack of humility here is hard to miss.) Briony’s 
forgiveness of her cousins, which is said to have “softened her tone,” essentially involves 
looking down upon them, as “she knew they could never understand her ambition” (p. 11). 
Here “forgiveness” is something those who see themselves as superior may dispense on 
their perceived inferiors. This idea continues into one of the most important scenes of the 
novel, in which Briony observes from a window a scene by a fountain involving her sister 
Cecilia and Robbie, the son of a domestic servant whom Briony’s father has taken under his 
wing and helped out financially with his education. When Cecilia, bafflingly to the observing 
Briony, strips to her underwear and dives into the water (actually to retrieve a piece of a 
Meissen vase, accidentally broken by Robbie in a clumsy attempt to help Cecilia fill it (pp. 
29-30)), Briony assumes she must be doing so in response to an order from Robbie. Briony 
later witnesses her sister and Robbie getting sexually intimate in the library. This is the first 
sexual encounter between the two, and results from an anatomically frank letter in which 
Robbie reveals his feelings for Cecilia; a version which is not the one Robbie intended to 
send, and which Briony read in delivering his missive to Cecilia. Though Cecilia is an entirely 
willing participant, the idea of Robbie as a sexual predator with a strange authority over her 
poor sister becomes fixed in Briony’s mind. Thus a little later, it is said that she “would never 
forgive Robbie his disgusting mind” (p. 115) – forgiveness again being presented as 
something Briony offers or withholds from the moral high ground she takes herself to 
occupy. 
The sense of herself as a writer is an important element in what leads the young 
Briony into her terrible “crime.” When her two young cousins go missing one evening and 
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everyone searches for them, their fifteen-year-old sister Lola is raped in the dark by an 
unknown assailant (actually a wealthy house-guest, Paul Marshall). Convinced of the truth 
of her version of events – that the rapist was Robbie – Briony is determined that she can 
describe the assailant, as “there was nothing she could not describe” (p. 165). She manages 
to convince the understandably confused and uncertain Lola that Robbie was the rapist, 
“with Briony’s certainty rising whenever her cousin appears to doubt herself” (p. 167). In an 
echo of the idea that forgiveness is a gift that the morally superior may dispense to (or 
withhold from) their inferiors, when Robbie - who is really the hero of the piece - returns 
with the lost twins, who are safe and sound, Briony tells herself this is “surely a cynical 
attempt to win forgiveness for what could never be forgiven” (p. 183). Immediately after 
Robbie’s arrest, when he and Cecilia are allowed a brief conversation just before the 
handcuffed Robbie is driven away, she also wrongly assumes that forgiveness is what Cecilia 
is magnanimously dispensing to Robbie (p. 185). In fact her sister – correctly, it turns out – 
never believed there to be anything for which to forgive him. Cecilia later leaves her family, 
unforgiven for their premature judgement of Robbie, to train as a nurse (p. 209). 
Thus Briony’s crime: to allow her moral certainty about Robbie’s character to colour 
the reports she gives about what she saw. The novel’s description of this - crucial to my 
analysis - requires quoting at length:  
As early as the week that followed, the glazed surface of conviction was not without 
its blemishes and hairline cracks. Whenever she was conscious of them, which was not 
often, she was driven back, with a little swooping sensation in her stomach, to the 
understanding that what she knew was not literally, or not only, based on the visible. 
It was not simply her eyes that told her the truth. It was too dark for that. … Her eyes 
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confirmed the sum of all she knew and had recently experienced. The truth was in the 
symmetry, which was to say, it was founded in common sense. The truth instructed 
her eyes. So when she said, over and again, I saw him, she meant it, and was perfectly 
honest, as well as passionate. What she meant was rather more complex than what 
everyone else so eagerly understood, and her moments of unease came when she felt 
that she could not express these nuances. She did not even seriously try. … Within a 
couple of days, no, within a matter of hours, a process was moving fast and well 
beyond her control. … She was asked again and again, and as she repeated herself, the 
burden of consistency was pressed upon her. What she had said she must say again. 
Minor deviations earned her little frowns on wise brows, or a degree of frostiness and 
withdrawal of sympathy. She became anxious to please, and learned quickly that the 
minor qualifications she might have added would disrupt the process that she herself 
had set in train. 
  She was like a bride-to-be who begins to feel her sickening qualms as the day 
approaches, and dares not speak her mind because so many preparations have been 
made on her behalf. The happiness and convenience of so many good people would 
be put at risk. These are fleeting moments of private disquiet, only dispelled by 
abandoning herself to the joy and excitement of those around her. So many decent 
people could not be wrong, and doubts like hers, she’s been told, are to be expected. 
Briony did not wish to cancel the whole arrangement. She did not think she had the 
courage, after all her initial certainty and two or three days of patient, kindly 
interviewing, to withdraw her evidence. However, she would have preferred to 
qualify, or complicate, her use of the word “saw.” Less like seeing, more like knowing. 
Then she could have left it to her interrogators to decide whether they would proceed 
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together in the name of this kind of vision. They were impassive whenever she 
wavered, and firmly recalled her to her earlier statements. Was she a silly girl, they 
implied, who had wasted everybody’s time? And they took an austere view of the 
visual. There was enough light, it was established, from stars, and from the cloud base 
reflecting street lights from the nearest town. Either she saw, or she did not see. There 
lay nothing in between; they did not say as much, but their brusqueness implied it. It 
was in those moments, when she felt their coolness, that she reached back to revive 
her first ardour and said it again. I saw him. I know it was him. Then it was comforting 
to feel she was confirming what they already knew.  
  She would never be able to console herself that she was pressured or bullied. 
She never was. She trapped herself, she marched into the labyrinth of her own 
construction, and was too young, too awestruck, too keen to please, to insist on 
making her own way back. She was not endowed with, or old enough to possess, such 
independence of spirit. An imposing congregation had massed itself around her first 
certainties, and now it was waiting and she could not disappoint it at the altar. (pp. 
168-70, my emphases). 
In a subsidiary crime, Briony takes Robbie’s letter from Cecilia’s room, without her 
sister’s permission, the obscenity it contains being in her mind “clinching evidence” (p. 176) 
of Robbie’s character and therefore - in her mind - his guilt. 
Briony’s sense of herself as a creature apart, something special because a writer, 
sometimes extends as far as self-obsession. Imagining her mother’s death, Briony makes 
this all about herself: “There would be a funeral in the village at which Briony’s dignified 
reticence would hint at the vastness of her sorrow. As her friends came up to murmur their 
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condolences they would feel awed by the scale of her tragedy” (p. 161). And after the rape, 
Lola’s being taken upstairs “left Briony centre stage” (p. 173): poetic justice in Briony’s eyes, 
given that Lola had earlier claimed for herself the central role in the play that Briony had 
wanted for herself. 
When we next meet Briony, five years later, her view of herself now is as unforgivable. 
(Robbie has joined the army as a condition of early prison-release and is fighting in grim 
conditions in the war; Cecilia, still estranged from her family, is working as a nurse.) Having 
given up her opportunity to study at Cambridge, instead training as a wartime nurse like her 
sister, Briony judges herself thus: “Whatever skivvying or humble nursing she did, and 
however well or hard she did it, whatever illumination in tutorial she had relinquished, or 
lifetime moment on a college lawn, she would never undo the damage. She was 
unforgivable” (p. 285). Her self-obsession, pride and a sense of herself as occupying the 
moral high ground are important elements of what is corrected by the moral perspective of 
humility that is growing in Briony. However – and this is vital - it also comes to correct her 
austerely unforgiving view of herself.  
3. Briony Tallis and the moral perspective of humility 
In debate about humility (or modesty), philosophers have disagreed about whether 
it involves a disposition to underestimate, or be ignorant of, accomplishments or self-worth 
in some respect (and if so to what degree)7 or whether it involves, on the contrary, accurate 
self-assessment which nonetheless takes care not to exaggerate one’s importance.8 I see 
this sort of discussion of humility as one in which comparison with other people plays too 
central a role.9 There is no need to think of humility thus. Rather, I shall develop the thought 
that what characterises the humble person is not that they think less of themselves 
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(comparing themselves with others and ranking themselves relatively low), but that they 
think about themselves less. In other words, they resist the temptation to have an 
orientation towards the world in which the self, its needs and concerns are what matters 
most (the kind of self-absorption we see in the young Briony).  
In an under-valued article, Joseph Kupfer has argued for four dimensions of the 
moral perspective of humility.10 First is acknowledgment of our “radical dependence,” 
glossed by Kupfer in terms of the need to acknowledge how much of whatever we might 
have achieved depends upon people other than ourselves and circumstances beyond our 
control. Second, Kupfer notes that a reference to the morally exemplary helps to keep our 
“technical” (e.g. sporting, academic or professional) achievements in perspective. An 
exceptionally successful athlete or scholar may thereby come to realise that someone 
whose achievements in the relevant fields are more modest than his own is nevertheless his 
moral superior, such as in terms of the time, energy and resources they give to others, a 
realisation that enables even “high achievers” to remain humble. 11  Third, setting high 
moral ideals enables even the morally exemplary to keep their moral achievements in 
perspective, as the infinite nature of the ethical demand means that there is always more to 
be done. When they succeed, they are aware of how much more is to be done, so rather 
than bask in their success they get on with doing more of what is needed. I would put it like 
this: they focus on the pursuit of the good, rather than their own achievements in pursuing 
the good. And fourth, relatedly, the moral perspective of humility incorporates an 
orientation towards other people and objectively valuable elements of the world such that 
the humble person appreciates and promotes the value of these goods apart from their 
instrumental value to herself.  
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The upshot of this is that the humble person’s attention is turned outwards, “away 
from themselves and toward things that have value in the world apart from themselves” – 
for instance, other people or serving a valuable cause – with the result that “humble 
individuals are disposed not to dwell on themselves.”12 Robert C. Roberts presents a similar 
picture – sometimes labelled the “low concern for status” view - of humility as “a trait 
marked by the absence of a certain kind of concern or concerned attention,”13 such that the 
humble person is focused on value-not-necessarily-related-to-the-self rather than herself. 
(In Kupfer’s view, the first two of his features tend to diminish in importance the more 
humility is informed by the third and fourth features, such that the most deeply humble 
people tend to pay less, rather than more, attention to themselves.14)15 
How, and to what extent, does Briony manifest this four-fold perspective? As she 
trains as a nurse near the start of the Second World War, there are moving scenes of 
treating the casualties from the evacuation of Dunkirk in which all the above four features 
are displayed to varying degrees. Briony’s recognition of her “radical dependence” emerges 
in her sense of herself as part of a team doing good and valuable work – a useful cog in an 
important machine, where what she does has value as part of what that wider collective 
achieves for its fellow humans. If Briony thought about her own worth at all, it would be 
primarily as part of this collective. But as her confidence in her competence develops, there 
is a hint of what Roberts describes as the ideal of humility, an “implicit and inarticulate 
sense of [her] own worth” which, if “articulated in a definite life view”, would be the 
“radical self-confidence” associated with a kind of humility: “a self-confidence so deep, a 
personal integration so strong that all comparison with other people, both advantageous 
and disadvantageous, slides right off [her]”.16 The humble person neither basks in her 
success nor feels a debilitating anxiety about her failures. Roberts suggests that such 
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humility is “an emotion-disposition - primarily a negative one, a disposition not to feel the 
emotions associated with caring a lot about one’s status.”17  
Kupfer’s second feature, the focus on exemplars, is a more subtly drawn theme 
explicitly, but can be observed both in the status Florence Nightingale is given in the training 
of the nurses and, more importantly, in the submission of Briony’s will to her superior Sister 
Drummond: terrifying but clearly excellent at her vocation. This connects to the third 
feature, namely setting high ideals and the recognition of the infinite nature of the ethical 
demand (such that any ethical achievements are kept in perspective). Briony’s growing 
competence as a nurse, and successes in treating casualties, are quietly and indirectly 
recognised by Sister Drummond. In one significant incident, she comforts Luc, a dying 
French soldier who, in his state of confusion, thinks Briony is a girl he loves. When Briony 
here transgresses the cardinal rule not to use her first name with patients, Sister Drummond 
does not – unlike on a previous occasion – reprove her for this. Rather, she overlooks it, tells 
Briony to wash her face, and minutes later, Briony returns to her duties on the ward (p. 
310). One never gets praise from Sister Drummond, but Briony’s progress is nevertheless 
silently acknowledged – yet there is always, immediately, more to be done. 
However, it is the fourth feature - Briony’s focus on others – that is perhaps the most 
important. The formerly self-obsessed little girl who lives in her imagination has become a 
young woman who has clearly acquired an orientation towards people other than herself 
and other entities of value in the world. The intensity of treating the seriously wounded and 
dying take her out of herself. This is the most obvious aspect of Briony’s moral growth in the 
years immediately after her “crime.” She starts to recognise nursing, originally taken on as a 
penance, as a possible manifestation of agapic love of the neighbour: “Sometimes, when a 
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soldier that Briony was looking after was in great pain, she was touched by an impersonal 
tenderness that detached her from the suffering, so that she was able to do her work 
efficiently and without horror. That was when she saw what nursing might be, and she 
longed to qualify, to have that badge. She could imagine how she might abandon her 
ambitions of writing and dedicate her life in return for these moments of elated, generalised 
love” (pp. 304-5). This “generalised” love is sometimes directed at a particular individual. 
When Luc asks “Do you love me?” she replies in the affirmative: “No other reply was 
possible. Besides, for that moment, she did. He was a lovely boy who was a long way from 
his family and he was about to die” (p. 309).  
The key point here, I take it, is that while part of Briony’s becoming reconciled with 
herself is indeed through her penance, she achieves this not through introspectively beating 
herself up. By focusing on others – the war injured and dying – and absorbing herself in the 
ethical demands of this essentially other-focussed role, she achieves something beyond 
what introspection alone could achieve. Perhaps the self-reconciliation at which self-
forgiveness aims is, as Mill famously claimed of happiness, something that can only be 
approached obliquely, “only to be attained by not making it the direct end.”18  
That said, a key part of Briony’s process of atonement involves fully facing up to 
what she has done. In “Two Figures by a Fountain,” the piece of fiction she submits to a 
magazine, the key aspects of her crime are absent. There is the observing young girl, but the 
rest of the novella dissipates into Woolfian stream of consciousness. In his relatively 
encouraging rejection letter, the critic Cyril Connolly asks of this young girl: “Might she come 
between them [the characters based on Robbie and Cecilia] in some disastrous fashion?” (p. 
13 
 
313). As a result of which, Briony realises that “the evasions of her little novel were exactly 
those of her life” (p. 320).  
When the eighteen-year-old Briony meets with her elder sister (at least as the much 
older Briony narrates it in her fictional account of this imagined scene), she offers publically 
to admit her error and renounce her earlier evidence, acknowledging the enormity of her 
“crime,” and insisting she does not expect forgiveness. Cecilia assures her she will indeed 
never forgive her (p. 337): echoes of the earlier view of forgiveness as dispensed from the 
moral high ground, but this time with Briony on the other side of this power-relation. There 
is also a description of a confrontation with an equally unforgiving Robbie (pp. 339ff.), but 
this too is fictional: we later learn that both Robbie and Cecilia were killed in 1940, Robbie 
from septicaemia in active service and Cecilia as part of the Blitz. Briony had in fact 
chickened out of facing her recently bereaved sister, limping home from Marshall and Lola’s 
wedding (Lola indeed married her rapist). We later learn that Briony never again saw her 
sister before the latter’s death. The elderly Briony’s willingness to recount the details of her 
crime, despite knowing that she will never be able to publish in her lifetime - Marshall and 
Lola being rich and highly litigious - is part of the atonement she attempts. Her crime must 
be on the record, to be published after Lola’s death, even if Briony herself will not live to see 
its publication. 
I submit that Briony meets the following criteria for legitimate forgiveness: an 
offence against another for which she judges herself responsible; reactive negative 
emotions (such as guilt and shame) thereto; a narrative account of what she did, and why, 
which makes her actions intelligible (the story we are reading); and contrition for the wrong. 
We also have commitment for change and taking serious steps to live up to this 
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commitment.19 By the end of the novel, it is clear that Briony has spent much of her life 
trying to atone for her crime and to demonstrate herself as being more than the person she 
was at thirteen: she describes it as a “fifty-nine year assignment,” with eight different drafts 
of the novel between 1940 and 1999 (p. 369). An underlying humility is implicit throughout 
this task of atonement.  
But Cecilia and Robbie are dead, and so unable to forgive. Self-forgiveness seems 
Briony’s only option. Yet I submit that Briony also meets - most of - the criteria Griswold 
outlines for self-forgiveness:  
One must reframe one’s view of oneself and see oneself in a new light; make a 
commitment to change one’s ways; confront honestly and fully the injury one has 
done …; have compassion for oneself, and refrain from objectifying oneself as though 
one was a “moral monster”; develop a narrative that explains how one came to do 
wrong and what emendatory steps one will take, and that expresses how one “re-
frames” one’s view of oneself … Crucially, one must take responsibility for oneself. The 
target of forgiveness remains the agent, not the deed. … A moral case of self-
forgiveness, finally, does not assume that self-reproach is always unjustified – on the 
contrary, it assumes that it may be justified and then, for good reasons, cease to be.20 
Returning to where we started, my interest now is in the last claim. Need self-reproach be 
entirely expunged in order to be able to say that someone has forgiven themselves? Most 
writers on self-forgiveness tend to assume so. However, like Dillon, I think that they are 
wrong - and that we can draw on Briony to see why.  
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4. Self-forgiveness and self-reproach: Holmgren on Dillon 
Margaret Holmgren is extremely sceptical about this view. In a careful critique of 
Dillon, Holmgren worries that we might “objectify” ourselves by conflating ourselves with 
our own past values and attitudes, which is inconsistent with respecting our own moral 
agency: “Although our past wrongful actions and attitudes warrant our condemnation, and 
in severe cases, our contempt, we as persons do not.”21 In the background here is the 
concern that this might lead to a total moral breakdown, in which we are unable to “go on” 
after our past wrongs. Holmgren’s position trades on a version of hating the sin but loving 
the sinner (and compare here Griswold’s condemning the deed, not the agent). This leads 
her to argue for what she calls “genuine self-forgiveness” as opposed to “self-
condemnation” (which she seems to conflate with Dillon’s “self-reproach”). In doing so, 
Holmgren claims that focusing on one’s own past record of moral performance is “devoid of 
any real value.” Asserting that there is “no reason to focus our attention on our past moral 
track record,” she instead commends “ways in which we can enhance our moral growth in 
the future, make genuine contributions to others, and engage in constructive activities.”22 
Self-forgiveness involves respecting one’s moral agency and using it responsibly, 
transcending the focus on oneself and one’s past wrongs, and turning one’s attention to 
what is truly of value. 
I certainly think there is something to this worry. We would not want a person so 
weighed down by guilt about their past actions that they were unable to do any subsequent 
good. But Holmgren is throwing out the baby with the bathwater in moving from legitimate 
worries about such cases to claiming that continued reflection on our past moral errors has 
no value.23 Briony, I submit, is a revealing counter-example to Holmgren’s claim. For what of 
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cases where my wrongful deed proceeds from having a character flaw? In considering such 
cases, Glen Pettigrove suggests that sometimes we need to forgive a wrongdoer not only for 
what she has done, but also for “who she is (or was).”24 When – as in the Briony case – the 
wrongdoer is me, what I can do is try to make myself less of the person from whom the 
wrongful act arose. But in order to do so, I need to understand the ways in which the 
character flaw that led to it may still be present within me. 
The novel touches upon this in the crucial last section. A seventy-seven-year-old 
Briony - now a successful novelist but who has recently received a medical diagnosis of 
approaching vascular dementia - returns to the former family home in which her crime was 
committed (now an elegant hotel) for a birthday party in her honour. One of the twins, now 
also a septuagenarian, has arranged a surprise: the première  of the thirteen-year-old 
Briony’s long abandoned play (all ten minutes of it). As the prologue begins, Briony 
describes her reaction: “Suddenly, she was right there before me, that busy, priggish, 
conceited little girl, and she was not dead either, for when people tittered appreciatively at 
‘evanesce’ my feeble heart – ridiculous vanity! – made a little leap” (p. 367, my emphasis). 
In other words, Briony acknowledges that for all that she has grown, her now still contains 
an element of her then. This changes what self-forgiveness is available to Briony. She 
acknowledges not only what she did at age thirteen, and the way in which her gross error 
then had disastrous, if unforeseen, consequences. She also recognises that a little of the 
“priggish, conceited little girl” is still with her. I suspect this reveals a truth about ourselves 
that many of us would, if we are honest, uncomfortably have to acknowledge about our 
past moral failings. Jeffrie Murphy describes this neatly as “the fear that the seeds of such a 
person might still remain within me.”25 
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For this reason, Briony also shows that Dillon is right to trying to strike a balance 
between self-forgiveness as Holmgren seems to understand it – Holmgren’s “genuine self-
forgiveness”, in which self-reproach has no role to play at all - and blanket, entirely past-
focussed self-condemnation. What neither Holmgren nor other critics of Dillon seem fully to 
register is Dillon’s explicit image of self-forgiveness as a kind of overcoming, on something 
like the model of overcoming a disability. The Paralympic athlete (a wheelchair basketball 
player, say) has not eradicated their disability – they are still wheelchair-bound – but rather 
they have managed to triumph over it such that it is no longer debilitating. As Dillon puts it, 
“to overcome something is not necessarily to eradicate it. We also overcome things by not 
letting them … control us, by lessening or constraining their power over us.”26 Self-
forgiveness, then, need not be seen as an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but rather something 
to which threshold conditions apply.27 Holmgren distinguishes what she calls “improvement-
oriented” self-assessment from “judgement-oriented” self-assessment.28 The former 
assesses how I am doing in terms of my normative self-conception and what amendments I 
need to make. She takes this to be of obviously fundamental moral importance. The latter 
sits in judgement on my past moral performance, and it is only this, Holmgren claims, which 
gives rise to shame, self-reproach and the inability to forgive oneself. It leads one to judge 
oneself as selfish, unworthy, a moral failure. What Holmgren seems primarily to object to is 
this totalising move.  
However, the neat distinction Holmgren here aims to draw seems false to moral 
reality, and again Briony can help us to see why. It is not clear that Briony ever quite 
conflates herself in totality with the person who committed her crime (in the sense that 
there was no more to her than that). So she never manifests judgement-oriented self-
assessment in such an extreme form. Holmgren suggests that we can abandon judgement-
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orientation “and the shame and self-reproach to which it leads, without loss.”29 Against 
Dillon’s argument that self-reproach (especially its emotional dimensions) reminds us of 
what we care about,30 Holmgren responds that improvement-orientation does this better 
than judgement-orientation, as the former is less self-focused. Part of Holmgren’s objection 
is that a Dillonesque self-forgiveness that retains room for self-reproach involves excessive 
focus on oneself.31 But Briony is a revealing counter-example to this claim too: despite the 
time she has spent facing up to her wrong, her life has not been excessively dominated by 
self-focus. We have seen how her experience as a nurse takes her out of herself into acts of 
agapic love: hers has not been a life of narrow self-obsession. And to her time as a nurse we 
might also add, in her later life, the value her novels have presumably given to her readers. 
In more general terms, this possibility is missing from Holmgren’s analysis: that a person’s 
judgement-oriented self-reflection might be done in such a way as to provide something 
valuable to others.  
(It is true that self-focus is central to Dillon’s analysis; the other-focused humility that 
I see in Briony is consistent with, but certainly not emphasised by, Dillon. Note that when 
Dillon mentions humility, her Kantian version of it is about ranking oneself low.32 So while 
my position supports Dillon’s general line on self-forgiveness as retaining room for self-
reproach, it is distinct from it.) 
Moreover, in urging us to ditch judgement-oriented self-assessment in favour of 
improvement-oriented self-assessment, it is ultimately unclear precisely what Holmgren is 
recommending. If the objection to judgement-orientation is merely to conflation (a Briony 
who thinks of herself as nothing but the person who committed her crime), then I would 
have no quarrel. But Holmgren seems to mean more than this, and overlooks the possibility 
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that judgement-orientation (in a sense distinct from such conflation) is a vital element of 
improvement-orientation. The elderly Briony’s judgement that the little girl is still with her is 
testament to this possibility. (And note that when she recognises the priggish little girl as 
still part of herself, the elderly Briony does not simply conflate the two.) Judgement-
orientation cannot be dismissed as a mere distraction if the future self is related in any deep 
way to the past self. So finally, I shall suggest that part of what makes self-forgiveness 
intelligible is that the future self is so related to the past self. In the final section, I turn to 
Griswold and Peter Goldie’s focus on the narrative dimension of self-forgiveness, in order to 
suggest what an improvement-oriented self-assessment that includes judgement-oriented 
self-assessment could look like. 
5. The narrative angle  
Clearly, what is involved in self-forgiveness on some level is me now judging me then. 
As noted, there is an important role for narrative in Griswold’s account of this.33 In 
Griswold’s view, narratives of forgiveness will be both “projective” and “recollective”.34 
Holmgren emphasises the former at the expense of the latter. But surely both are 
important. Griswold talks of growth – that with which Holmgren is also concerned – in terms 
of realising an ideal. But crucially, he adds that the significant change involved here “is not 
just a rupture with the past, let alone its obliteration, but its reinterpretation and integration 
into a larger narrative”.35 Holmgren’s account, I suggest, de-emphasises the latter features 
in such a way that it comes uncomfortably close to recommending a mere “rupture with the 
past.” It’s as if I am to say: “Sure, I got drunk while showing off my handgun collection, and 
accidentally shot two of the neighbours. I feel awful about that, but there’s no point in 
crying over spilt milk: I must do better next time.”36 But this does not take seriously enough 
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the damage I did this time. Griswold, like Holmgren, notes the importance, in both 
requesting forgiveness and forgiving, of “the decision not to be determined by the past 
alone.”37 But Holmgren, it seems to me, is ultimately not willing, beyond a certain 
unspecified stage in the self-forgiveness process, to be influenced by the past at all, and this 
is problematic.38 There can still be room for me now to continue to see me then as 
blameworthy, and to continue to experience the appropriate emotions about this. And the 
fact that me now and me then are the same person – not only in a formal sense but in the 
way that Briony registers in seeing the “prissy little girl” in her current self - makes this 
something other than third-person observation. Holmgren seems to downplay this 
important difference.39 
We can see both the recollective and projective elements at work in the case of 
Briony. Her multiply redrafted novel clearly shows her engaged in narrative thinking about 
her past. But this also has a projective dimension, since it involves engaging in narrative 
thinking of herself in the future. As Goldie argues in a discussion of self-forgiveness which 
builds on Griswold’s work, 
Engaging in narrative thinking of myself in the future, imagining myself acting on the 
self-governing policies that I have now adopted because of my regrets for what I did in 
the past, I can now conceive of myself in future episodes, acting as I now know I 
should. And I now feel, external to the narrative, emotions that express my 
satisfaction, through strong reflective endorsement, with my self-governing policies. In 
the long run, my aim is that these policies will become embedded in my character and 
personality traits, so that the policies no longer need to be conscious, explicit parts of 
my self-governance. By then my commitment for change will have been fully met.40  
21 
 
My suggestion is that this is what an improvement-oriented self-assessment that includes 
judgement-oriented self-assessment would look like. Me now’s continuing to blame me then 
is an important dimension of responsible self-forgiveness.41 It is being well along in – indeed, 
towards the end of – this process that allows the elderly Briony, at the end of the novel, to 
sleep. But if we view self-forgiveness as a threshold, rather than an “all or nothing” 
condition, then we can see her as having forgiven herself not in the sense that she has 
extinguished all self-reproach, but in the sense that she is no longer controlled by it, 
allowing her to “live well enough.” Or, in Briony’s case, to die a good death. 
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